Roads To Riches
Why
investors are clamoring to take over America's highways,
bridges, and airports—and why the public should be
nervous
May 7, 2007
By
Emily
Thornton, BusinessWeek
Steve Hogan was in a bind. The executive director of
Colorado's Northwest Parkway Public Highway Authority
had run up $416 million in debt to build the 10-mile
toll road between north Denver and the Boulder Turnpike,
and he was starting to worry about the high payments. So
he tried to refinance, asking bankers in late 2005 to
pitch investors on new, lower-interest-rate bonds. But
none of the hundreds of investors canvassed was
interested.
Then, one day last spring,
Hogan got a letter from Morgan Stanley (MS) that promised to solve all of his problems. The bank
suggested Hogan could lease the road to a private
investor and raise enough money to pay off the whole
chunk of debt. Now Hogan, after being inundated with
proposals, is in hot-and-heavy negotiations with a team
of bidders from Portugal and Brazil. "We literally got
responses from around the world," he says.
In the past year, banks and private investment firms
have fallen in love with public infrastructure. They're
smitten by the rich cash flows that roads, bridges,
airports, parking garages, and shipping ports
generate—and the monopolistic advantages that keep those
cash flows as steady as a beating heart. Firms are so
enamored, in fact, that they're beginning to consider
infrastructure a brand new asset class in itself.
With state and local leaders scrambling for cash to
solve short-term fiscal problems, the conditions are
ripe for an unprecedented burst of buying and selling.
All told, some $100 billion worth of public property
could change hands in the next two years, up from less
than $7 billion over the past two years; a lease for the
Pennsylvania Turnpike could go for more than $30 billion
all by itself. "There's a lot of value trapped in these
assets," says Mark Florian, head of North American
infrastructure banking at Goldman, Sachs & Co (GS).
There are some advantages to private control of roads,
utilities, lotteries, parking garages, water systems,
airports, and other properties. To pay for upkeep,
private firms can raise rates at the tollbooth without
fear of being penalized in the voting booth. Privateers
are also freer to experiment with ideas like peak
pricing, a market-based approach to relieving traffic
jams. And governments are making use of the cash they're
pulling in—balancing budgets, retiring debt, investing
in social programs, and on and on.
But are investors getting an even better deal? It's a
question with major policy implications as governments
relinquish control of major public assets for years to
come. The aggressive toll hikes embedded in deals all
but guarantee pain for lower-income citizens—and
enormous profits for the buyers. For example, the
investors in the $3.8 billion deal for the Indiana Toll
Road, struck in 2006, could break even in year 15 of the
75-year lease, on the way to reaping as much as $21
billion in profits, estimates Merrill Lynch & Co. (MER) What's more, some public interest groups complain that
the revenue from the higher tolls inflicted on all
citizens will benefit only a handful of private
investors, not the commonweal (see BusinessWeek.com,
4/27/07,
"A Golden Gate for Investors").
There's also reason to worry about the quality of
service on deals that can span 100 years. The newly
private toll roads are being managed well now, but
owners could sell them to other parties that might not
operate them as capably in the future. Already, the
experience outside of toll roads has been mixed: The
Atlanta city water system, for example, was so poorly
managed by private owners that the government reclaimed
it.
Such concerns weigh on the minds of public officials
like Hogan. He intends to negotiate aggressively with
corporate suitors and has decreed that the buyer must
share future toll-hike revenues with the local
governments that built the highway. But with the market
for infrastructure still in its infancy, every deal is
different. The ideal blend of up-front payment, toll
hikes, and revenue sharing hasn't been found.
FLOOD OF MONEY
The nascent market in roads and bridges in the U.S.
follows the shift toward privatization in Europe and
Australia that began with British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. It took longer to
develop in the U.S. because of the $383 billion
municipal bond market, which has been an efficient
source of capital for governments over the years.
But with the explosion of money flowing into private
investments recently, fund managers have been exploring
the fringes of the investing world in search of fresh
opportunities. Now a slew of Wall Street firms—Goldman,
Morgan Stanley, the Carlyle Group, Citigroup, and many
others—is piling into infrastructure, following the lead
of pioneers like Australia's Macquarie Group. Rob
Collins, head of infrastructure mergers and acquisitions
at Morgan Stanley, estimates that 30 funds are being
raised around the world that could wield as much as $500
billion in buying power for U.S. assets.
Many investors think of infrastructure investing as a
natural extension of the private equity model, which is
based on rich cash flows and lots of debt. But there are
important differences. Private equity deals typically
play out over 5 to 10 years; infrastructure deals run
for decades. And the risk levels are vastly different.
Infrastructure is ultra-low-risk because competition is
limited by a host of forces that make it difficult to
build, say, a rival toll road. With captive customers,
the cash flows are virtually guaranteed. The only major
variables are the initial prices paid, the amount of
debt used for financing, and the pace and magnitude of
toll hikes—easy things for Wall Street to model. "With
each passing week, there are more parties expressing
unsolicited interest in some kind of a financial
transaction that will involve one of our assets directly
or indirectly," says Anthony R. Coscia, chairman of the
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey.
Firms are even beginning to market infrastructure to
investors as a separate asset class, safe like
high-grade bonds but with stock market-like returns—and
no correlation with either. The Standard & Poor's
500-stock index has returned about 10% a year, counting
dividends, since 1926. Bonds have returned about 5%.
Firms say infrastructure will beat both, and without
having to sweat out market dips along the way. That's a
huge selling point at a time when stock, bond, and
commodity markets around the world are becoming
increasingly interconnected.
Investors can't get in fast enough. They recently
deluged Goldman Sachs with $6.5 billion for its new
infrastructure fund, more than twice the $3 billion it
was seeking. "We're using [infrastructure] as a
fixed-income proxy," says William R. Atwood, executive
director of the Illinois State Board of Investment, who
plans to invest $600 million to $650 million, or 5% of
its portfolio, in infrastructure funds over the next
three years. "We're hoping to get 11% to 12% returns and
lower risk." Pension funds in particular like the
long-term investment horizons, which match their funding
needs well. Infrastructure "delivers similar yield
expectations to high-yield bonds and real estate, with
less risk," says Cynthia F. Steer, chief research
strategist at pension consulting firm Rogerscasey.
On the other side of the bargaining table from the
investment firms sit struggling governments suddenly
amenable to the idea of selling control of assets to
solve short-term problems. The burden of maintaining
roads, bridges, and other facilities, many built during
the 1950s, is becoming difficult to bear. Federal,
state, and local governments need to spend an estimated
$155.5 billion improving highways and bridges in 2007,
according to transportation officials, up 50% over the
past 10 years. And that's hardly the only obstacle they
face. In 2006 alone, states increased their Medicaid
spending by an estimated 7.7%, to $132 billion. And
state and local governments could be on the hook for up
to $1.5 trillion in retiree liabilities, estimates
Credit Suisse. At the same time, politicians find it
difficult to raise taxes. Chicago's former chief
financial officer, Dana R. Levenson, sums up the
situation: "There is money to be had, and cities need
money." U.S. Representative Chaka Fattah, a Pennsylvania
Democrat who is running for mayor of Philadelphia,
proposes to privatize the Philadelphia International
Airport and use the proceeds to fund poverty programs—a
much easier sell than a tax increase.
The combination of eager sellers and hungry buyers is
shaking loose public assets across the country. The
99-year lease of the Chicago Skyway that went for $1.8
billion in 2005 was the first major transaction. Last
year came the Indiana deal. Now states and cities are
exploring the sale of leases for the turnpikes in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, a toll road in Texas, Chicago
Midway Airport, and several state lotteries. Suddenly
politicians around the country are wondering how much
cash they might be sitting on. Based on the going rate
of about 40 times toll revenues, the iconic Golden Gate
Bridge could probably fetch $3.4 billion were California
interested in selling. The Brooklyn Bridge? If
permission were granted by New York City to charge the
same tolls as the George Washington Bridge, a private
owner might shell out as much as $3.5 billion for it.
PAVEMENT PRICING
But there's a downside to the quick cash: planned toll
hikes that are usually quite aggressive. Chicago's
Skyway could see car tolls rise from $2 in 2005 to $5 by
2017. For some perspective, if a similar scheme were
applied to the Pennsylvania Turnpike during its 67 years
of existence, the toll for traveling from the Delaware
River to the Ohio border would be as much as $553 now
instead of $22.75. Macquarie, which teamed up with
Spain's Cintra to purchase the Chicago Skyway and the
Indiana Toll Road, underscored the governmental
trade-off during a presentation at the recent White
House Surface Transportation Legislative Leadership
Summit: "More Money or Lower Tolls." In an extreme
scenario, governments could begin to sell properties
that aren't tolled to private owners who will impose
fees.
Of course, tolls won't go to the moon if they result in
dramatic reductions in traffic. For example, investment
firm NW Financial Group estimates that if the Chicago
Skyway pricing scheme were applied to New York's Holland
Tunnel over its 80 years, it would cost $185 to travel
through it instead of the current $6. "No one will pay
that much," says Murray E. Bleach, president of
Macquarie Holdings (USA) Inc. "It's just not going to
happen."
Still, Indiana legislators became so alarmed by promised
hikes that they changed the terms before the toll road
lease was completed. The state set aside $60 million to
pay the difference in tolls for up to two years or until
the buyers install electronic tolling equipment. After
that, the fee for cars with electronic toll cards will
rise to $4.80 over the full 157 miles, while the fee for
cars without the cards will soar to $8. After 2010, both
rates will rise each year by 2%, the pace of inflation,
or the rate of economic growth, whichever is highest.
The certainty of future toll hikes doesn't jibe with the
uncertainty of service quality. Assets sold now could
change hands many times over the next 50 years, with
each new buyer feeling increasing pressure to make the
deal work financially. It's hardly a stretch to imagine
service suffering in such a scenario; already, the
record in the U.S. has been spotty. In 2003 the city of
Atlanta ended a lease of its water system after
receiving complaints about everything from billing
disputes to water-main breaks. The city wrestled with
the owner, United Water Inc., over basics like the
percentage of water meters it should monitor. Both
parties acknowledge that the contract lacked specifics.
In the end, "we didn't believe we were getting
performance," says Robert Hunter, commissioner for
Atlanta's Dept. of Watershed Management. "I don't
believe the city will ever look at privatizing essential
services again." United Water says the contract wasn't
financially feasible because Atlanta's water system was
in worse shape than the city had represented.
A CHAMPION'S PERSPECTIVE
States are wrestling with other public policy issues,
too. Bankers say New York could reap a combined $70
billion for long-term leases on a bunch of assets,
including the state's lottery, the Tappan Zee Bridge,
and the New York State Thruway. New York state officials
have looked into the option of leasing the lottery,
which itself might command $35 billion—a sum that could
substantially upgrade, say, New York's higher education
system. The downside? The state would probably have to
remove constraints on the lottery's marketing designed
to discourage people from gambling more than they can
afford. If the state insists on keeping the constraints
in place, it could reduce the value of selling it.
Chicago's experience shows the possibilities and the
pitfalls of privatization. Former CFO Levenson has been
one of the movement's biggest champions. He was an
architect of the Skyway deal, which kicked off the
market. Then he sold control of parking garages to
Morgan Stanley for $563 million. Next, he started
shopping around a lease for Midway Airport that could
fetch as much as $3 billion. And soon the city hopes to
auction off rights to operate some recycling plants.
Levenson dismisses critics who argue that he has dumped
prized assets. "This is not like where a person goes in
and buys a loaf of bread from a store and walks out with
that loaf of bread," he says. "Some entity, we expect,
will make an offer to lease the Midway Airport for 75 to
99 years, and the following day I'm pretty sure it will
still be there."
Wearing a crisp suit and stylish eyeglasses, Levenson
looks like the Wall Streeter he once was, working for
Bank One Corp. and Bank of America Corp. (BAC) before taking the Chicago city job in 2004. In April
he returned to banking: As a managing director at the
Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), he now beats the bushes for infrastructure deals.
Levenson doesn't understand how local governments can
afford not to put public works up for sale. Thanks to
the 99-year lease for the Skyway, Chicago has paid off
its debt and handed over $100 million to social programs
like Meals on Wheels. Plus, says Levenson, it's earning
as much in annual interest on the $500 million it has
banked from the transaction as it used to earn from
running the Skyway ($25 million).
In some ways, Levenson argues, the city still has
control over the highway. The agreement with the new
owners spells out guidelines in mind-numbing detail,
dictating everything from how quickly potholes must be
filled (24 hours) to how rapidly squirrel carcasses must
be removed (8 hours). If Macquarie and Cintra violate
those conditions, the city can take back the road.
So far, the buyers have strictly adhered to the rules.
At 7 a.m. on a Wednesday in March, five workers begin
another day at the Chicago Skyway's Snow Command. On
their to-do list are potholes to be checked and cracks
to be sealed. Juan Rodriguez used to patrol the freeway
for Chicago city. Today, he cruises the road for private
owners. He discovers some potholes have grown
unacceptably large because of salt that was spread the
previous night. There's some tire debris that must be
removed, and a disabled vehicle holding up traffic.
A SMOOTH RIDE?
In the past, Rodriguez says, he had to write out a
ticket for each problem, which would be added to a long
list of chores. Addressing problems often took days,
Rodriguez recalls. But by 10:25 a.m., all of this
morning's issues on the Skyway's 7.8-mile stretch of
pavement are resolved. "The new owners are taking the
Skyway to a whole new level," he says.
They've certainly spent money on improvements. The
message "a clean workplace is a happy workplace" is
scrawled on a whiteboard in a freshly painted and
ventilated garage where workers meet. There's electronic
tolling, which didn't exist before. A bunch of new lanes
are under construction. The investments seem to be
paying off: Since taking over two years ago, the
Skyway's operators estimate traffic has risen 5%.
It's all encouraging, except that Chicago "probably
could have gotten more without privatizing," according
to Dennis J. Enright, a principal and founder of NW
Financial. His firm's analysis shows that Chicago could
have done a lot better by handling the whole deal
itself. It could have raised tolls and sold tax-exempt
municipal bonds backed by the scheduled hikes. That
would have given the city the up-front cash it needed
while preserving some of the income from the toll hikes.
Instead, that money will go to Macquarie and Cintra.
Meanwhile, the higher tolls will take a big bite out of
lower-income people's wallets. "You have to ask yourself
if you want roads that used to be considered a public
service to be rationed by income class," says Princeton
University economics professor Uwe E. Reinhardt. Chicago
says it hasn't received any formal complaints from
citizens, though two different drivers recently went to
extremes to avoid tolls, says Skyway maintenance manager
Michael S. Lowrey. When the new owners introduced free
towing for broken-down vehicles, the drivers called the
Skyway for help, claiming to be stranded. After workers
hauled the vehicles past the tollbooths, they hopped in
their cars and sped away.
For workers, the privatization wave has wrought many
changes. Skyway toll takers used to be full-time city
employees with rich benefits. Now most are part-time
independent contractors without benefits. Brian
Rainville, executive director of the Chicago Teamsters
Joint Council 25, helps manage the union's pension fund.
When he listened to a recent pitch from a pension
consultant about infrastructure funds, it sparked a
realization: The returns he might generate for his
pensioners could be canceled out by the union's
shrinking number of contributors. "It's pretty obvious
that it's not sound fiscal policy for the [pension] fund
to undercut the people it's serving," Rainville says.
Pushback against private investors is now playing out in
different ways elsewhere. In Pennsylvania, the state
turnpike commission is going head-to-head with private
bidders for the right to operate the state's 537-mile
toll road. Pennsylvania desperately needs cash to repair
its nearly 6,000 structurally deficient bridges. Some
pundits expected Pennsylvania Governor Edward G. Rendell
to propose hikes in gas taxes and other fees to fund the
projects. But in December, Rendell unexpectedly
announced plans to privatize the turnpike. Timothy J.
Carson, vice-chairman of the commission, scrambled to
submit an expression of interest for the turnpike to
continue to run itself. His proposal is being judged
against many others, including those from big Wall
Street firms.
Carson isn't dissuaded by arguments that investors are
better qualified to run turnpikes profitably. "There's
no magic here," he says. "These [deals] are largely
driven by one factor: the permitted toll increases."
Carson says the state doesn't need to hand over the
turnpike to private owners. Historically, he says, the
state wanted the turnpike to collect only enough money
to break even. But it could just as easily adopt its own
toll-hike schedule. The state could also charge tolls on
more roads. In other words, the public could remain in
control simply by changing the turnpike's mission. That
would ensure that the benefits of the toll hikes were
spread throughout the populace, says Carson.
Pennsylvania's isn't the only turnpike authority
exploring the possibility of bidding for roads. The
North Texas Tollway Authority calculated in March that
it would have valued a partially constructed 25-mile
stretch of highway near Dallas 26% more than a private
investor had bid. Now it's considering making a formal
bid. And on Apr. 11, the Texas House of Representatives
passed an amendment by a vote of 134 to 5 to impose a
two-year moratorium on privatizing state toll roads. "We
need to put the brakes on these private toll contracts
before we sign away half a century of future revenues,"
said representative Lois W. Kolkhorst, who proposed the
bill. A similar bill was passed in the state senate on
Apr. 19.
With so much money at stake and so many options
available to states, it's impossible to know how the
great infrastructure craze may play out. But this much
is certain, says Pennsylvania's Carson: "People are
willing to pay more than they are currently being
charged. The only question is to what extent you're
willing to take advantage of that."